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ARTICLES
REACHING A DEEP POCKET UNDER THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
MARK STEPHEN POKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)1 was
enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.2 The
primary purpose of RICO was to combat the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate businesses.3 To eradicate this infiltration, RICO authorizes
substantial criminal and civil penalties. This Article exclusively examines
RICO in a civil context. A civil violation of RICO can result in the recov-
ery of treble damages, attorney fees and costs.4 In recent years, the Act has
been applied in areas far afield from the commonly perceived domain of the
* The author expresses his gratitude to Michael J. Mazurczak, Esq., Melick & Porter, Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, for his critique of this Article, and David Elbaor, Esq., Connerton, Ray &
Simon, Washington, D.C., for his insightful lectures at the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984).
2. Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 18
(1982 & Supp. 1987)).
3. The Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
reads, in part, that "[i]t is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime...
Id. at 923.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Recently, amendments to the federal RICO statute were intro-
duced that would have limited recoveries in most RICO business litigation to actual damages.
The bill entitled "RICO Reform Act of 1989," similar to other legislative proposals to limit
RICO, was not enacted. The bill limited recovery to costs, attorney fees, and discretionary puni-
tive damages of up to twice actual damages for limited categories of private plaintiffs. Treble
damages would have remained available in a suit against a defendant convicted of a related
offense.
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racketeer. Today, a major source of RICO claims originates from common
business and financial relationships.' This broad application has created a
feverish dispute over the proper interpretation and scope of RICO, which
has resonated through academia6 as well as the courts.
By virtue of RICO's civil remedy provisions, plaintiffs can convert many
common torts into federal treble damage actions. However, in many in-
stances an individual defendant is unable to satisfy a RICO judgment. In
such a case, a RICO suit would not be economically worthwhile, unless the
plaintiff had access to a "deep pocket." Plaintiffs have attempted to reach
these "pockets" directly through the application of the Act's provisions and
indirectly under the theories of respondeat superior' and aiding and abet-
ting.' In the typical RICO suit, where the plaintiff is defrauded by a com-
pany, courts have held that the company cannot be liable under all of the
Act's civil liability provisions.9 Accordingly, plaintiffs seeking access to a
5. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Smith, 712 F.2d 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (bankruptcy);
Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983) (relationship between
lender and borrower); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (corporate take-
over); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1982) (pension fund); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571
F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1983) (real estate developments); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (investor and broker relationship); S.A. Mineracao Da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (joint venture); Meineke
Discount Muffler Shops v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (franchisor and franchisee
relationship).
6. See generally Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982); Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Com-
promise, 71 MINN. L. REV. 827 (1987); Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L.
REV. 201 (1981); Milner, A Civil RICO Bibliography, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 409 (1985); Wexler,
Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some Maturational Problems and Proposals for Reform, 35 RUTGERS
L. REV. 285 (1983); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982).
7. For cases adopting the doctrine, see Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.
1987); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582
F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1984). Contra Scho-
field v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986); Panes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. II. 1982).
8. See, e.g., Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d 1349; Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,
782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986); Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
9. A majority of courts have ruled that under § 1962(c) a corporation-enterprise cannot be
held liable as a person under RICO. See, e.g., Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1297; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d
at 1349; Schofield, 793 F.2d at 28; Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir.
1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399-402 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985);
Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061-62
(8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th Cir.
1982).
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"deep pocket" through the application of the Act's liability provisions have
been forced to bring their case under other sections of the Act." Until
recently, courts have not embraced the application of the respondeat supe-
rior doctrine in RICO cases." The Third and Seventh Circuits have held
that a company can be sued directly under the Act as well as indirectly
under the common law theory of respondeat superior." However, under the
Seventh Circuit's restrictive interpretation of respondeat superior the appli-
cation of the doctrine is unnecessarily limited. In addition, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also ruled that a company
can incur RICO liability under the theory of aiding and abetting. 3 The
courts' adoption of these theories potentially represents an important break-
through in RICO litigation.
This Article addresses the means as well as the appropriateness of grant-
ing a RICO plaintiff access to a "deep pocket." The Article begins with an
overview of the RICO Act, as well as the elements of a RICO claim, and
will focus on some of the special considerations in bringing a RICO claim.
A brief discussion of Wisconsin's Organized Crime Control Act will follow.
After laying this foundation, the means and appropriateness of granting ac-
cess to a "deep pocket" will be explored from two perspectives. First, a
plaintiff's ability to directly hold a company liable under RICO's provisions
will be examined. Second, a plaintiff's ability to hold a company liable
under RICO, based upon the theories of respondeat superior as well as aid-
ing and abetting, will be analyzed.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RICO
A. The Statutory Framework
Broadly speaking, a RICO violation results "from the use of power, ac-
quired by crime, to gain or maintain a foothold in an enterprise that oper-
ates in interstate commerce."1 4 In order to understand the elements of a
civil RICO cause of action, it is necessary to refer to three different sections
of the Act. Subsection 1964(c) provides a RICO claimant with a private
10. Because plaintiffs have been precluded from holding a corporation-enterprise liable as a
person under § 1962(c), they have been forced to allege a violation under § 1962(a) or § 1962(b).
See, e.g., Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1297.
11. See supra note 7.
12. Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1300; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1351.
13. Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1352.
14. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L.
REV. 43, 48 (1983).
1989]
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right of action.15 This section awards treble damages, costs and attorney
fees to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion of section 1962 ... ."16 Over the last few years the use of the private
right of action provision has dramatically increased. 17 The increase has
been compelled, in part, by the possibility of winning treble damages and
attorney fees. 8 Legislative changes to the penalty provisions have been
proposed in an attempt to reduce the amount of RICO litigation. 9 Argua-
bly, the increase in litigation is primarily due to the broad language of the
Act. In the preamble of RICO, Congress expressly provided that "the pro-
visions of ... [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."20 In light of RICO's expansive breadth and harsh penalties, it is
not surprising that plaintiffs have applied the Act in "garden variety" busi-
ness fraud cases.21
The second section that is crucial to an understanding of a civil RICO
claim is Section 1962.2 Under Section 1962, four types of relationships are
prohibited. Subsection 1962(a) prohibits the investment of income, derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity, in "any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. '23 In
15. Subsection 1964(c) reads as follows: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984).
16. Id.
17. Of the 270 district court decisions interpreting RICO prior to 1985, only 2% of the cases
were decided throughout the 1970s, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in
1983, and 43% in 1984. ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, RE-
PORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55 (1985).
18. See supra note 15.
19. See supra note 4.
20. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981) (statutory construc-
tion impairing RICO's broad purposes is unacceptable).
21. See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.
1984); Alcorn County, Miss. v. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.
1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1984).
23. Subsection 1962(a) provides in full as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assist-
ing another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the
[Vol. 72:511
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addition, subsection 1962(a) requires that the defendant must have engaged
as a principal in the racketeering activity.24 Essentially, this subsection is
concerned with criminals who buy their way into businesses by investing
their ill-gotten gains.
Subsection 1962(b) prohibits any person from acquiring any interest in,
or exerting control over, an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.25 Clearly, this provision was directed at organized crime's use of
force to extort transfers of business interests. However, the provision can
be applied to everyday commercial activities such as mergers.
Subsection 1962(c) is the most frequently used provision.26 This subsec-
tion prohibits any person employed by or associated with an enterprise from
conducting the affairs of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.27 It must be recognized that subsection 1962(c) requires only a
showing of participation in the enterprise's affairs. Clearly, no evidence of
income source or control of an enterprise is required. Subsections 1962(a)
and 1962(b) appear to place a significant additional burden on a plaintiff. A
demonstration of the source and disposition of illegal income or control,
issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accom-
plices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after
such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1984).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), which defines "principal" as referenced by § 1962(a), provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever
willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be
an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal.
25. Subsection 1962(b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in
or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1984).
26. Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplication of
Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 B.U.L. REV. 561, 567 (1985).
27. Subsection 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1984).
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which may exist only informally, must be established.2 8 Lastly, subsection
1962(d) prohibits a conspiracy to violate subsections (a), (b) or (c).2 9
By virtue of the interaction of Section 1964 and Section 1962, it is clear
that a plaintiff stating a claim for civil damages under RICO has two plead-
ing burdens. First, a plaintiff has to allege that the defendant has violated
Section 1962.30 Second, a plaintiff must allege that he was "injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962." 31 To satisfy
the first pleading burden, the plaintiff must allege the existence of the fol-
lowing seven elements: "(1) that the defendant (2) through the commission
of two or more acts (3) constituting a 'pattern' (4) of 'racketeering activity'
(5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an interest in, or partici-
pates in (6) an 'enterprise' (7) the activities of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce. '32
Lastly, Section 1961 must be carefully examined in order to understand
a civil RICO cause of action.33 The statutory definitions, which give mean-
ing to the RICO violations of Section 1962, are presented in Section 1961.
In view of the interrelationship between Sections 1962 and 1961, a detailed
examination of the Act's definitions is warranted.
B. Definitions
1. Person
Only persons can sue or be sued under Section 1962. Pursuant to sub-
section 1961(3), " 'person' includes any individual or entity capable of hold-
ing a legal or beneficial interest in property."' 34 By virtue of this broad
definition, as well as RICO's preamble, it would appear that civil RICO
should not be restricted to particular persons.35 In addition, use of "in-
cludes" rather than "means" in subsection 1961(3) conveys the conclusion
28. One commentator has stated, in reference to § 1962, that "[o]nly one of the three prohibi-
tions in title IX requires tracing of funds . . . violations of the other two - which essentially
proscribe acquisition or operation of a business through racketeering activity - will be far easier
to prove." McClellan, The Organized Crime Act or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?,
46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 145 (1970).
29. Subsection 1962(d) reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1984).
30. Moss, 719 F.2d at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
34. Id. at § 1961(3).
35. But see Divco Constr. & Realty Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 712, 714 (S.D.
Fla. 1983); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Adair v. Hunt
Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Il. 1981).
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that items not specifically enumerated may be "included" in the definition.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the majority of courts have ruled that
the culpable person need not have some connection to "organized crime" in
order to be subject to a civil RICO action.36
2. Racketeering Activity
RICO punishes conduct, not status. The targets of RICO are defined by
what they do rather than by the characteristics they possess. Consequently,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant participated in a "pattern" of rack-
eteering activity.37 Subsection 1961(1) defines racketeering activity as an
act or threat that is chargeable under certain state criminal laws, or an act
that is indictable under a host of federal statutes, including mail fraud, wire
fraud, and any offense involving "fraud in the sale of securities."38 These
activities are referred to as "predicate acts." In view of Congress' compre-
hensive approach in defining "racketeering activity," it would be difficult to
execute a crime relating to commerce that would not fall within the scope of
RICO. Generally, most private RICO suits, involve business and security
fraud.39
Until recently, some courts had required that a defendant be convicted
of the predicate act(s) before a civil action could be brought.4" The United
States Supreme Court, however, in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,4 held
that RICO's language does not contain any indication of the prior convic-
tion requirement.42 Consequently, racketeering activity consists of acts for
which the defendant has been indicted as well as for acts for which he could
be indicted.43 Notwithstanding the Court's rejection of this controversial
36. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams
Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1984); Moss, 719 F.2d 5; Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir.
1982); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. Pa. 1984); McLendon v. Continen-
tal Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J. 1985); Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 500 (D.D.C. 1984).
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
39. Of 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud,
37% involved common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% involved
"allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals." ABA
SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BusINEss LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL
RICO TASK FORCE 55 (1985).
40. Bunker Ramo Corp., 713 F.2d at 1287; USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689
F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974);
Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
41. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
42. Id. at 483-93.
43. Id. at 488 (quoting S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)).
1989]
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limitation, it should be recognized that a plaintiff must plead and prove the
elements of the predicate act(s) to sustain the "racketeering activity" ele-
ment of a civil RICO claim. For example, if mail or wire fraud violations
are the predicate acts, a plaintiff must allege: (1) formation of a scheme or
artifice with intent to defraud, and (2) use of the mails or wires for the
purpose of executing the scheme.' However, the majority of courts have
ruled that a plaintiff must only prove these elements by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard.4" Moreover, prior to the Court's holding in Sedima, many courts
ruled that in order to recover under civil RICO, a plaintiff was required to
prove a special type of injury, over and above that caused by the predicate
acts.46 In rejecting the "special injury" requirement, the Sedima Court ob-
served that RICO was an aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies
and develop new methods of fighting crime.47
3. Pattern
As noted, to succeed on a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege and
prove a "pattern of racketeering activity."48 Subsection 1961(5) defines a
"pattern" as "at least two acts of racketeering activity."4 9 However, these
must have occurred within ten years of each other with at least one act
occurring after the effective date of the statute.50 While two acts are neces-
sary, as a practical matter, they may not be sufficient to constitute a "pat-
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 636 (4th
Cir. 1981); Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
45. See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1987);
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir. 1987); Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Ware-
house Co., 782 F.2d 475, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 780 F.2d 267, 279-80 n.12 (3d Cir. 1985); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F.
Supp. 975, 1001 (D. Minn. 1986); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1309 (W.D.
Mich. 1986); Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. at 477 (E.D. La.
1986); Bosteve Ltd. v. Marauszwski, 642 F. Supp. 197, 202 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Stainton v.
Tarantino, 637 F. Supp. 1051, 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
46. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 422 (1985); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded sub. nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); Arndt v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dade
Springs Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 592 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
47. Sedima, 473 U.S. 479, 493-500 (1985); see also Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank, 600 F.
Supp. 1466 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ohio 1984);
Lopez v. Richards, 594 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1984); Joseph v. Algemene Bank Nederland,
N.V., 592 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
50. Id.
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tern." Specifically, in order for separate acts to form a "pattern," they must
be related and have continuity.5 1
Case law suggests that if a similarity of purpose exists, that is, the pur-
pose of conducting the affairs of the enterprise, then the acts are related. 2
Essentially, the acts have continuity under RICO if they are not sporadic,
and therefore, pose a threat of continuing racketeering activity.53 The con-
tinuity aspect of a "pattern," however, has proved to be a problematic con-
cept for the courts to standardize. Unfortunately, there has been a plethora
of differing views between the federal courts as to what is necessary to sat-
isfy the continuity element of a "pattern."
For example, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that a single "scheme" in-
volving numerous acts against several victims may constitute a pattern. 4
The Seventh 55 and Ninth56 Circuits have held that a "single grand scheme"
involving numerous acts against a single victim may constitute a "patterna."
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has observed that a single scheme against a
single victim does not qualify as a pattern even if numerous discrete acts are
involved 7.5  The Fourth Circuit has been even more restrictive, in that, even
if a single scheme involves numerous victims, the acts still are not continu-
ous so as to qualify as a pattern s.5  The Eighth Circuit has also taken the
stance that two separate schemes must exist before a pattern can be estab-
lished. 9 It would appear that the more restrictive interpretations of a "pat-
tern" are the product of an anti-RICO bias towards RICO's use against
legitimate businesses. The breadth of RICO's venue provision, which will
be discussed,6" and the differing views of continuity among the circuits, has
increased the prevalence of "forum shopping" between circuits.
It is anticipated that forum shopping as to the pattern question will be
reduced to some degree by virtue of the recent Supreme Court holding in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.6 In -J. Inc., the Court unan-
imously rejected the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme requirement.62 The
51. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
52. United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1981); Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F.
Supp. 1402, 1409 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
53. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969).
54. Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
55. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
56. Sun Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987).
57. Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987).
58. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
59. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
60. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
61. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
62. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 4953-54, 4958.
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Court noted that continuity is centrally a temporal concept and may be
demonstrated in a variety of ways.63 The flexible approach adopted by the
Court falls short of a definitive explanation of the pattern requirement, and
will require further judicial interpretation and refinement. More signifi-
cantly, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion noted that the Court's perceived
inability to clearly construe the pattern element, and Congress' failure to
clarify the statute, may be enough to render the statute unconstitutionally
vague. 64
4. Enterprise
The existence of an "enterprise," which is the instrument or the target
of racketeering, is required to establish a civil RICO claim.65 Under the
Act, the term "enterprise" is defined to include "any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity .... 66 Relying
on this broad definition, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v.
Turkette67 that an "enterprise" encompasses legitimate as well as illegiti-
mate entities and associations of individuals. 68 However, courts have indi-
cated that an enterprise is more likely to be found where the alleged
enterprise is a legal entity as opposed to an associational enterprise.69
Clearly, where a legal entity is the vehicle or target of the racketeering ac-
tivity, identifying the enterprise is not difficult because evidence of the legal
existence of the entity will normally be sufficient.7° As to associations in
fact, their existence may be proven by both circumstantial and direct
evidence.7"
63. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 4954. With respect to continuity, the majority asserted that a
series of related predicate acts extending over a "substantial period of time," or other evidence of
acts constituting or threatening "long-term criminal conduct" is necessary. In contrast, acts ex-
tending over a few weeks or months, which do not threaten long-term racketeering activity, are
not sufficient. Id.
64. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 4957-58 (Scalia, J., concurring). It should be noted that the RICO
statute has been upheld as not unconstitutionally vague by lower courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
67. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
68. Id. at 580-81.
69. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060, 1064 (4th Cir. 1984); Alcorn County,
731 F.2d at 1168; Lopez, 594 F. Supp. at 491; Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F.
Supp. 342, 347 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 497-99 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
70. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060.
71. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. 1982). Note that a foreign or a
domestic business may constitute an enterprise.
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In attempting to determine the proper scope of RICO, courts continue
to wrestle with two "enterprise" related issues. First, courts disagree as to
whether proof of the "enterprise" must be distinct from proof "of the pat-
tern of racketeering activity."72 In Turkette, the Supreme Court ruled that
the existence of an enterprise and the existence of racketeering activity are
distinct elements of a RICO claim.73 Some courts have interpreted this de-
cision to stand for the proposition that the "enterprise" must have an exist-
ence entirely distinct and independent of the racketeering activity.74 This
restrictive interpretation is inherently based upon the discredited view that
RICO defendants must be tied to organized crime. On the other hand,
some courts have read Turkette to hold that proof of the "racketeering ac-
tivity" and the enterprise need not be separate and distinct, notwithstanding
the fact that the enterprise and "racketeering activity" are separate ele-
ments.76 This interpretation is consistent with the Turkette Court's asser-
tion that "the proof used to establish these separate elements may in
particular cases coalesce."
'77
Second, there is a split of authority as to whether the "person" commit-
ting a RICO violation must be distinct from the "enterprise. '78 Part IV of
this Article presents and analyzes the courts' resolution of this issue.79
C. Special Considerations
1. Venue and Process
The RICO Act contains its own provisions for venue as well as service
of process. The Act's venue provision provides that a civil RICO claim
may be instituted in any "district court of the United States for any district
in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his af-
fairs."80 Under this provision, a suit may be brought against a corporation
72. Compare Moss, 719 F.2d at 22 and United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89-90 (2d Cir.
1983) with Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060 and United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 223-24 (3d
Cir. 1983).
73. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
74. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060; United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir.
1980).
75. See, e.g., Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.
76. Moss, 719 F.2d at 22; Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 89-90.
77. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
78. Compare United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983) and Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1061-62 and Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D. Mass. 1982) with United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961,
987-90 (11th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 267-71 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
79. See infra notes 153-213 and accompanying text.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285,
1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
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in the judicial district in which it is incorporated.8' Moreover, by virtue of
the "transacts his affairs" language, a claim may be instituted against a cor-
poration if it carries on business of "a substantial and continuous charac-
ter" within the district.81 The above venue provision is not exclusive,
however, in that an action may also be brought where the cause of action
"arose" pursuant to the general federal venue statute.83 Federal courts rely-
ing on the federal venue statute in civil RICO cases have held that the claim
"arose" where the defendant's predicate act of communications
originated.84
As to service of process, the RICO Act provides that "in any action or
proceeding under this chapter [process] may be served on any person in any
judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or
transacts his affairs."85 Clearly, this provision provides for nationwide ser-
vice of process. Where nationwide service of process is authorized, courts
have held that due process requires that a defendant only have minimum
contacts with the United States.86 Accordingly, the "minimum contacts"
test, as enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,87 does not ap-
ply to a civil RICO case. It should be recognized that the RICO Act is
silent as to the manner in which service may be made, and therefore, Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls the manner of service.88
Proper jurisdiction and venue must exist as to each defendant in a civil
RICO action. 89 In cases involving multiple defendants, some of the defend-
ants may not have the necessary contacts with the district to be brought
into the action. In these instances, the court may "cure" the venue or pro-
cess deficiencies by ordering, pursuant to subsection 1965(b) of the Act,
that the parties residing outside the district be brought before the court if
81. Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1133-34.
82. DeMoss v. First Artists Production Co., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (quot-
ing King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. 1972)).
83. Clement v. Pebar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 443 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Lightner v. Tremont Auto
Auction, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 818
(1987); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (D. Del. 1978). The
general federal venue statute is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).
84. See, e.g., Clement, 575 F. Supp. at 439-40; Medical Emergency Serv. Ass'n v. Duplis, 558
F. Supp. 1312, 1314-15 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981); Clement, 575 F.
Supp. at 438.
87. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
88. Webb & Roddy, Some Practical Implications of Civil RICO Cases, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV.
299, 322 (1985).
89. Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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"the ends of justice" so require.9" In light of the breadth of the Act's venue
and service of process provisions, it seems likely that forum shopping be-
tween the districts will occur. Consequently, a uniform interpretation of
RICO's substantive provisions is crucial.
2. Concurrent Jurisdiction
The RICO Act clearly confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts
to entertain civil actions, but it does not indicate whether this jurisdiction is
concurrent with that of state courts or is exclusive. Unquestionably, attor-
neys are attracted to RICO by virtue of its treble damages and attorney fees
provisions.91 In the past, however, many attorneys may have been reluctant
to file a suit under RICO because they wished to avoid federal court. Conse-
quently, the attorneys only filed a suit under state law. Attorneys may have
based their decision to avoid federal court on the fact that they were more
familiar with state courts than with federal courts, or because the federal
courts were an inconvenient forum. The issue of concurrent jurisdiction
shall be decided definitively in the near future by the United States Supreme
Court.92 Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lou v. Belzberg93
ruled that federal RICO suits can be brought in state courts. 94 Accord-
ingly, it appears that pending the Supreme Court's determination, plaintiffs'
attorneys may no longer have to sacrifice treble damages and fees for famili-
arity or convenience.
The general rule is that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
suits concerning federal statutes unless Congress' intent can otherwise be
discerned from (1) express language in the statute; (2) an unmistakable im-
plication from legislative history, or (3) clear incompatibility between state
court jurisdiction and federal interests.95 The Ninth Circuit held that none
of these factors is present in the RICO context.96 Specifically, subsection
1964(c) provides that suits may be brought in federal court.97 With respect
to the second factor, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that subsection 1964(c)
"was consciously modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
section 15, which has been judicially construed to require exclusive federal
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1982); see, e.g., Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1087 (D.
Del. 1984); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 n.8 (D. Del. 1978).
91. See supra note 15.
92. Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, - U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2428
(1989).
93. 834 F.2d 730 (1987).
94. Id. at 735-39.
95. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
96. Lou, 834 F.2d at 736-37.
97. Id. at 734.
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jurisdiction."98 Nevertheless, the court held that this is not sufficient to
constitute an "unmistakable implication" so as to circumvent the general
rule. Finally, the court correctly concluded that the incompatibility excep-
tion was inapplicable because federal judges do not have any special exper-
tise in RICO suits.99
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to rule on the issue of concurrent
jurisdiction in RICO cases. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit asserted in
dicta that it would be reluctant to conclude that suits cannot be brought in
state court. " The lower federal courts have been sharply divided on this
issue.101 Two state supreme courts, which have addressed the issue, have
held in favor of state court jurisdiction."0 ' However, there have been deci-
sions to the contrary by state appellate courts. 103
3. Statute of Limitations
The RICO Act does not include a statute of limitations provision. Ac-
cordingly, it has been a long-standing practice to borrow the most analo-
gous state statute of limitations."° Because RICO cases concern interstate
transactions, the statute of limitations of several states could apply to a
RICO claim.?15 Therefore, the adoption of state statute of limitations laws
has caused uncertainty and confusion.'16 In addition, it creates a danger of
increased forum shopping, and the application of an unduly short statute of
limitations.107 Recently, the United States Supreme Court resolved the
98. Id. at 736-37. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits recovery of treble damages and rea-
sonable attorneys' fees in federal antitrust cases. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
99. Lou, 834 F.2d at 736-37.
100. County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 905 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Chivas
Products Ltd. v. Owen, 864 F.2d 1280, 1283-86 (6th Cir. 1988) (exclusive jurisdiction).
101. For cases upholding state court jurisdiction, see Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, 655 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 381 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Luebke v.
Marine Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wis. 1983). Cases finding exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion include: Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Spence v.
Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Wyo. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365,
1370-71 (E.D. Wash. 1985).
102. Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375 (1985); Rice v. Janovich, 109
Wash. 2d 48, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987).
103. See, e.g., Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 489 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1985); Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985).
104. See, e.g., Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342, 347 (M.D.N.C.
1982).
105. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 153 (1987).
106. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization - Basic Con-
cepts Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1047 (1980).
107. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 154.
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statute of limitations issue. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Asso-
ciates,"8 the Court ruled that the Clayton Act, a federal law, offers the
closest analogy to civil RICO,' 09 and therefore, the Clayton Act's four-year
statute of limitations should apply to all federal civil RICO suits.10° The
Supreme Court held that if courts were required in each case to choose the
most analogous state limitations period, intolerable uncertainty and "time-
consuming litigation" would result."'
However, Agency Holding Corp. did not present the Court with an op-
portunity to decide when a civil RICO cause of action accrues. In general,
there are two schools of thought with respect to the accrual of a civil RICO
action. Some courts have held that a civil RICO claim runs from the date a
plaintiff knew or should have known that the elements of the civil RICO
cause of action existed. This is otherwise known as the simple discovery
rule, which has apparently been adopted by five federal appellate courts." 2
The Third Circuit expanded upon the discovery rule in Keystone Ins.
Co. v. Houghton."3 In particular, Keystone holds that the simple discovery
rule applies unless:
as a part of the same pattern of racketeering activity, there is further
injury to the plaintiff or further predicate acts occur, in which case
the accrual period shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the last injury or the last predicate act which
is part of the same pattern ....
The courts which utilize the discovery rule appear to focus exclusively
on the injury element for accrual purposes. In contrast, under the Keystone
formulation, a plaintiff "must also be in a position where they know or
should know that the predicate act causing injury is part of a pattern of
racketeering.""
By virtue of the holding in Agency Holding Corp., plaintiffs may be enti-
tled to reopen their RICO case if they lost an earlier case on statute of
limitations grounds. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Saint Fran-
108. Id. at 143.
109. Id. at 156.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 150.
112. Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1987);
Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175 (11tl Cir. 1985); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429
(9th Cir. 1984); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1984).
113. 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988).
114. Id. at 1130 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cis College v. Al-Khazraji,'16 it would appear that the Agency Holding Corp.
decision should only be applied prospectively. In other words, if a plaintiff
was planning on filing a law suit, but had not done so because the law in the
applicable jurisdiction had a statute of limitations exceeding four years, the
claim should not be barred even though the four-year period had expired.
However, some courts, that have addressed this issue, have concluded that
the statute of limitations should be retroactively applied. 17 In addition,
plaintiffs may be able to utilize equitable tolling doctrines to reopen a suit
otherwise barred on statute of limitations grounds.'
1 8
III. STATE RICO - WISCONSIN
In the late 1970s, state laws modeled after the federal RICO Act began
appearing with increasing frequency. 9 While some states essentially cop-
ied the federal act, others enacted laws that are substantially different from"
the federal RICO Act. For example, under Arizona and Rhode Island law,
a plaintiff need not establish a pattern of activity.1 E° In addition, not all of
the state laws allow recovery of treble damages."' In fact, some of the
states do not authorize private suits. 22 Because of this diversity in state
anti-racketeering legislation, it is not possible to make meaningful general-
izations as to the content of the states' laws.
Section 946.80 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which is entitled the "Wiscon-
sin Organized Crime Control Act," generally parallels federal RICO law.123
116. 481 U.S. 604 (1987). The principal holding in Saint Francis College related to the right
of members of ethnic groups to sue for job discrimination under the federal civil rights laws. Id.
at 607. The Court also held that where a statute of limitations is shortened as a result of a court
decision, the decision should be applied prospectively only and should not ban a claim by a party
who had been relying on existing caselaw. Id. at 608-09 (emphasis added).
117. See, e.g., Lund v. Shearson American Express, 852 F.2d 182, 184 (6th Cir. 1988); Snider
v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
118. Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
119. RICO laws have beer enacted in Puerto Rico and the following 24 states: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Missis-
sippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. See RICO Bus. Disputes
Guide (CCH) 4000-4520 (1986).
120. See State of Arizona ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 667 P.2d 1304 (1983) (no
pattern requirement under Arizona law); State v. Brown, 486 A.2d 595 (R.I. 1985) (no pattern
requirement under Rhode Island law).
121. Hawaii authorizes only actual damage recoveries. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-8(c)
(1986). In addition, Utah and Wisconsin only grant double damage recoveries. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-1605(1) (1986); Wis. STAT. § 946.86(4) (1987-88).
122. Neither California, Connecticut nor New York authorize private suits under their anti-
racketeering legislation.
123. WIs. STAT. §§ 946.80-.87 (1987-88).
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As a result, the pleading requirements for a claim under federal RICO are
applicable to a claim under the Wisconsin formulation, except where the
Wisconsin legislature expressly adopted alternative requirements. 124 The
Wisconsin Act does differ from federal RICO in some important respects.
This Article will briefly highlight these differences as well as some similari-
ties in an effort to provide the Wisconsin practitioner with some guidance.
At the onset, it must be pointed out that the intent of the Wisconsin Act "is
to impose sanctions against [the] subversion of the economy by organized
criminal elements and to provide compensation to private persons injured
thereby."' 25 Clearly, it was not the legislature's intent "that isolated inci-
dents of misdemeanor conduct be prosecuted under [the] act, but only an
interrelated pattern of criminal activity the motive or effect of which is to
derive pecuniary gain."' 126 Although the state appellate courts and the fed-
eral bench's treatment of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act has
been limited, the issues of pattern and separateness of the person from the
enterprise have been explored.
An important difference between the Wisconsin Act and federal RICO
exists in the way the laws define a "pattern of racketeering activity." Under
the Wisconsin Act, at least three interrelated incidents of racketeering ac-
tivity are required before the activity constitutes a "pattern."'127 Moreover,
the last incident must have occurred within seven years of the first inci-
dent.128 The definition expressly provides that acts "which may form the
basis for crimes punishable under more than one statutory provision may
count for only one incident of racketeering activity."' 29 Unlike the federal
statute, isolated events are not eliminated from the scope of the Wisconsin
Act.' 30 As a result, under Wisconsin RICO a pattern may result notwith-
standing the existence of a simple episode of wrongdoing.13' Clearly, a
claim under Chapter 946 does not stand or fall with a federal claim. 3 2
The issue of whether subsection 946.83(3) requires a person to be sepa-
rate from the enterprise was addressed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
124. City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992, 1000-01 (E.D. Wis.
1988).
125. Wis. STAT. § 946.81 (1987-88).
126. Id.
127. Wis. STAT. § 946.82(3) (1987-88).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Pillar Corp. v. Enercon Indus. Corp., 694 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
131. Id.
132. Design Shelters, Inc. v. Pizzeria Enters., Inc. et al., RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 9
6862 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1988).
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in State v. Judd.'3 3 Note that subsection 946.83(3) is Wisconsin's counter-
part to subsection 1962(c) of the federal statute. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that subsection 946.83(3) requires that a person be separate from the
enterprise. 134 The court also addressed the question of whether a sole
shareholder of a corporation was in fact "separate" from the corporation
for purposes of subsection 946.83(3). The court concluded that under the
Wisconsin Act "an individual is separate from a solely owned enterprise, as
a matter of law, when that enterprise is a corporation."' 135
Similar to the federal statute, a state law action under Chapter 946 can
be brought based upon allegations of federal mail, wire or securities
fraud. 1 36 In addition, under the Wisconsin Act, statutory prohibitions exist
concerning the following activities: (1) bribery of public officials; 137 (2)
commercial bribery; 13 (3) false statements by officers or directors in corpo-
rate certificates or reports; 139 (4) obtaining property by deception or false
pretense;" 4° (5) extortion;14 1 (6) franchise misrepresentations; 42 (7) record
tampering; 143 (8) state securities violations;" (9) theft of trade secrets,"'
and (10) banking officer and employee misconduct. 14 6
As stated above, Wisconsin's counterpart to Section 1962 of the federal
statute is found in Section 946.83 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The only
meaningful difference between these sections is that subsection 946.83(1)
requires that a person using or investing proceeds received from a pattern of
racketeering activity receive the said proceeds "with knowledge that they
were derived ... from a pattern of racketeering activity." 47 In contrast,
subsection 1962(a) does not require that the defendant have knowledge. It
must be recognized that a plaintiff's ability to reach a deep pocket under
section 946.83(1) may be restricted by virtue of the knowledge requirement.
Another important distinction between the Wisconsin Act and the fed-
eral statute is that a Wisconsin plaintiff can only recover two times the ac-
133. 147 Wis. 2d 398, 433 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1988).
134. Id. at 402, 433 N.W.2d at 262.
135. Id. at 405, 433 N.W.2d at 263.
136. Wis. STAT. § 946.82(4) (1987-88).
137. See id. at §§ 946.10-13.
138. Id. at § 134.05.
139. Id. at 99 180.88, 181.69, 943.39.
140. Id. at § 943.20.
141. Id. at § 943.30.
142. Id. at § 553.41(3).
143. Id. at § 943.39.
144. Id. at §§ 551.41-.44, 184.09.
145. Id. at § 943.205.
146. Id. at §§ 221.17, .31, .39, .40.
147. Id. at § 946.83(1).
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tual damages he sustains. 148 However, under Wisconsin law a plaintiff may
also recover punitive damages.149 The Federal RICO statute is silent as to
the recovery of punitive damages. It should be noted that under the Wis-
consin Act, state authorities, similar to federal authorities under the federal
act, may institute civil proceedings.1 50 Moreover, the Wisconsin Act is sim-
ilar to the federal statute in that a court has jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations by ordering divestiture of a person's interest in an enter-
prise, imposing restrictions on future activities or investments of any per-
son, or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.151 Lastly,
it should be pointed out that the statute of limitations under the Wisconsin
Act is six years after a violation terminates or when the cause of action
accrues. 152
IV. REACHING A DEEP POCKET UNDER SECTION 1962
RICO proscribes certain activities of "persons" in connection with an
enterprise. Section 1961 of the statute contains such broad definitions of
the terms "person" and "enterprise" that a corporation may satisfy both
definitions. 153 This raises the question of whether the same corporation can
serve as a person and an enterprise in the same case. In other words, must
the enterprise be distinct from the culpable person? If a corporation can be
held liable as a culpable person when it serves as an enterprise, then the
plaintiff has access to a deep pocket.
The majority of courts have held that a corporation cannot serve as an
enterprise and be liable as a person in the same case under RICO's civil
liability provisions,"' Recall that damages under RICO are imposed for
violations of Section 1962. In turn, Section 1962 prohibits four types of
interactions between enterprises and persons.' 55  Generally, courts have
only allowed a corporation to assume the roles of enterprise and person at
148. Id. at § 946.86(4).
149. Id.
150. Id. at § 946.86(3).
151. Id. at § 946.86(1). The federal counterpart is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a) and (b)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
152. Wis. STAT. § 946.87(1) (1987-88). In light of the similarity between the federal and
state acts, it is likely that Wisconsin courts would rely on federal case law when addressing the
issue of when a cause of action accrues.
153. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (1lth Cir. 1982).
154. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 874-78; Long, supra note 6, at 245-46; Note,
supra note 26, at 593-98.
155. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
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the same time in claims brought under subsections 1962(a) and (b).15 6 This
Article will now explore the courts' treatment of the person-enterprise dis-
tinction under Section 1962.
Most of the distinct person and enterprise debate has focused on subsec-
tion 1962(c). This subsection makes it unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with an enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity. 157 All of the circuits that have addressed the distinct person and
enterprise issue in the context of subsection 1962(c), except for the Eleventh
Circuit, have ruled that the liable person must be a separate entity from the
enterprise. 158 It should be noted that RICO's legislative history is silent on
the separateness requirement. Nevertheless, in examining the statute, some
courts have found that a violation of subsection 1962(c) requires two parties
by virtue of the subsection's "employed by" or "associated with" lan-
guage.' 59 Accordingly, the subsection requires a relationship between an
enterprise and a person rather than requiring only the use of an enterprise
by a person as under subsections 1962(a) and (b).16
Courts have generally sought to buttress this statutory analysis by ex-
amining the relevant policies and potential consequences of requiring a dis-
tinction. Specifically, these courts have concluded that permitting a suit
under subsection 1962(c) against the corporation-enterprise, which may
have been a passive instrument or victim of the racketeering activity, would
cause an obvious distortion of the statute.' 61 Other courts have ruled that
subsection 1962(a) makes the corporation-enterprise liable only if it benefits
156. A minority of courts, however, have held that the same corporation can assume the roles
of enterprise and person at the same time under subsection 1962(c). See, e.g., Hartley, 678 F.2d at
988-89; United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 268 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Although the federal
district court in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southwest Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-54
(D.N.J. 1983) did not reach the issue of the enterprise-person distinction, it expressed doubt over
the viability of the distinction. Id.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
158. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988-89.
159. See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1987); Haroco, Inc.
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399-402 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606
(1985).
160. Enigmatically, most of the courts have generally refrained from engaging in a statutory
analysis. In United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), the court
relied upon an analogy between individuals and corporate entities. Id. at 1190. The Ninth as well
as the Eighth Circuit have adopted the Computer Sciences rationale without further analysis. See
Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th
Cir. 1982).
161. See, e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d
Cir. 1987); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401.
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from the racketeering activity. 162 Consequently, it has been concluded that
the primary purpose of RICO, which "is to reach those who ultimately
profit from racketeering,"'' 61 would not be served by allowing the same cor-
poration to serve as an enterprise and a person in the same case under sub-
section 1962(c).164 However, as one might expect, courts have reached a
contrary result in subsection 1962(a) claims. The courts' statutory analysis
of subsection 1962(c) seems to be well-reasoned. By using the terms "em-
ployed by" and "associated with," it appears that Congress contemplated a
person distinct from the enterprise under subsection 1962(c). Critics may
suggest that subsection 1962(c) only refers to "any person" and not to the
culpable person. However, logic dictates that the culpable person is encom-
passed within "any person." Nevertheless, the policy rationale that the dis-
tinction is needed to protect victim enterprises seems ill-founded because an
enterprise will be treated as a person if criminal intent is established. 165
If corporate liability was limited to subsections 1962(a) and (b), a plain-
tiff would have to trace the flow of illegal funds to the corporation-enter-
prise or establish that the corporation-enterprise controlled the funds. On
the other hand, under a subsection 1962(c) claim, the plaintiff need only
establish a relationship. On its face, it appears that by limiting corporate
liability to subsections (a) and (b), the courts have eliminated those cases in
which the racketeering activities did not result in the acquisition or control
of funds by the corporation-enterprise. 166 As a practical matter, this should
not be the case because the distinction between a person and an enterprise
under subsection (c) is vulnerable to clever pleading tactics by plaintiffs. 67
A plaintiff should be able to reach into the corporation's pocket under sub-
section 1962(c) if he alleges that the corporation is the culpable person and
that the enterprise is "an association of fact," which is comprised of the
corporation including its officers and directors.1 68 It must be remembered
that the definition of an enterprise includes associations of individuals.169
162. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (Ist Cir. 1986); Masi v.
Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refin-
ing Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402; Bruss Co. v. Allnet Com-
munication Servs., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
163. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402.
164. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
165. Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984); Kronfeld v. New Jersey
Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1470-71 (D.N.J. 1986); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp.
1430, 1434 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
166. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984).
167. See Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1059-60 (explanation of how to plead around the distinction).
168. See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
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However, some courts have refused to allow inclusion of the corporate-de-
fendant within the association of fact enterprise.170 As a result, the enter-
prise will lack sufficent structure and the plaintiff's claim will be deficient.
In addition, a defendant may attack the plaintiff's pleading by impleading
the remaining members of the enterprise, which would effectively destroy
any separateness.
In determining whether the person must be distinct from the enterprise
under subsection 1962(a), the federal appeals courts have engaged in statu-
tory and policy analysis. Accordingly, the courts' approach to subsection
(a) is consistent with their approach in examining subsection (c) claims.
The circuits have uniformly ruled that the person need not be distinct from
the enterprise under subsection (a). 71 Moreover, the majority of district
courts have held that the same corporation may occupy the roles of a per-
son and an enterprise at the same time under 1962(a).1 72 One district court,
however, has concluded that if it is inappropriate to plead a corporation as
both the person and the entity under subsection (c), then it is inappropriate
to do so under subsection (a). 73 This rationale is specious because of the
differences in the language of the respective subsections. Recall that subsec-
tion (a) only requires a use of an enterprise, whereas subsection (c) requires
a relationship. In addition, it appears that the express language of subsec-
tion (a) encompasses circumstances under which the enterprise itself is lia-
ble for wrongdoing, in contrast to subsection (c).
The district courts have reached inconsistent results as to whether the
culpable person must be distinct from the enterprise under subsection
1962(b).174 Recently a major step in resolving this conflict was taken by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers,'75 the
Seventh Circuit ruled that subsections (a) and (b) only require the use of an
enterprise.' 76 Therefore, under Liquid Air Corp, there is no distinction be-
tween "investing in an enterprise" under subsection (a) and acquiring or
maintaining an interest in an enterprise under subsection (b). 77 It should
170. See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
171. See supra note 163.
172. But see Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Willam-
ette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (D. Ore. 1984).
173. Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1197.
174. Compare Medallion T.V. Enters. v. SelecTV, 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1294-95 (C.D. Cal.
1986) and Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(requiring distinction) with Commonwealth v. Derry Constr., 617 F. Supp. 940, 942-44 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (rejecting distinction).
175. 834 F.2d 1297.
176. Id. at 1307.
177. Id.
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be recognized that this decision addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff
alleging a subsection 1962(b) violation could hold a corporation vicariously
liable under respondeat superior, rather than directly liable under subsection
1962(b).178 Nevertheless, the reasoning of this decision is directly applica-
ble and would be controlling in the Seventh Circuit in a case where a plain-
tiff seeks to impose liability upon a corporation directly under subsection
1962(b). As the Liquid Air decision indicates, a plaintiff's ability to hold a
corporation liable is not limited to the direct application of the RICO stat-
ute. This Article will now address these "indirect" means by which a plain-
tiff can obtain access to a deep pocket.
V. REACHING A DEEP POCKET INDIRECTLY
A. Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of respondeat superior requires that the master answer for
the acts of his servant done on behalf of the master and within the scope of
the servant's employment.' 79 The basic justification for the application of
the doctrine is that "it would be unjust to permit an employer to gain from
the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsible for the mis-
takes, the errors of judgment and the frailties of those working under his
direction and for his benefit."' 8 ° The modem economic rationale for the
application of the doctrine is that the employer is in a better position to
absorb the cost of these liabilities and to shift these costs to the public.' 8 ' In
other words, the costs of these liabilities are internalized into the business.
In order to hold the employer corporation liable under RICO, it appears
that the plaintiff would only need to establish an employer-employee rela-
tionship and that the employee violated Section 1962. However, as discussed
below, courts seem to require knowledge of the illegal acts by the employer
as well as actual benefit to the employer.
The Third Circuit in Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North
America, 82 was the first circuit to address and embrace the common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior in the RICO context. 183 However, the court
restricted the application of the doctrine to claims based upon subsection
1962(a).1 84 Prior to the holding in Petro-Tech, the District of Columbia
178. Id.
179. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499-501 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
180. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
181. PROSSER, supra note 179, at 500-01.
182. 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1356-62.
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Circuit Court had rejected the theory of respondeat superior in a claim
brought under subsection 1962(c).' 85 This rejection is consistent with the
circuit's holdings that the person and the entity must be distinct under sub-
section 1962(c). To allow a plaintiff to, in effect, circumvent this person-
enterprise distinction indirectly under the doctrine of respondeat superior
would be impermissible.' 86 In embracing the doctrine in Petro-Tech, the
Third Circuit noted that common law doctrines can be applied in litigation
under a federal statute whenever they "advance the goals of the particular
federal statute."' 87 The court then concluded that the basic justification for
the common law doctrine is "that it is consistent with RICO's goal to facili-
tate recovery by the victims of racketeering activity."' 88 The only other
circuit to address and approve the application of respondeat superior is the
Seventh Circuit.
In Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers,'89 the Seventh Circuit held that respon-
deat superior is "entirely appropriate under both subsections (a) and (b)."190
The court observed that the imposition of vicarious liability under respon-
deat superior was consistent with congressional intent, provided the corpo-
ration derived some benefit from the RICO violation.' 9' The "derived
benefit" limitation is inconsistent with the doctrine of respondeat superior in
that intent to benefit the principal is the focus of determining liability under
the doctrine. 92 The Seventh Circuit has mistakenly narrowed the applica-
tion of the doctrine by requiring an actual benefit as opposed to just an
intent to benefit.' 93 One commentator has urged that the internalization of
"business costs" caused by respondeat superior is not within the intent of
RICO. 9 4 Moreover, the application of the doctrine has caused concern
that victim enterprises may be exposed to undeserved liability. 95 Both of
these concerns appear to be misplaced in view of the Seventh Circuit's limi-
tation that the defendant-corporation actually derive some benefit from the
RICO violation. Even if an actual benefit were not required these concerns
would be alleviated by the scope of employment requirement of respondeat
superior.
185. Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1986).
186. But see Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984).
187. Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1356.
188. Id. at 1358.
189. 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987).
190. Id. at 1307.
191. Id.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228, 235-36 (1958).
193. Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1307.
194. See Goldsmith, supra note 6.
195. See Note, supra note 26, at 599-605.
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However, just two months after the decision in Liquid Air, a panel com-
posed of two of the three Liquid Air judges rejected the doctrine of respon-
deat superior in D & S Auto Parts v. Schwartz.19 6 A careful examination of
these cases, however, allows one to reconcile these apparently inconsistent
holdings.197 Liquid Air involved high level corporate officials and as such
the corporation-enterprise, though not directly perpetrating the illegal acts,
was deemed to have stood by silently while its employees conferred benefits
upon it.' 98 In contrast, D & S Auto Parts involved lower level officers.' 99
Therefore, D & S Auto Parts should only be read as rejecting vicarious lia-
bility in situations in which the corporation is unaware of its employees'
wrongdoings.2" However, the critical factor for determining liability under
respondeat superior is whether the agent was acting in the scope of his or
her employment, and not whether the employer had "knowledge."
Under D & S Auto Parts, a key factor in determining the corporation's
awareness is the level of the corporate officials involved. Involvement of
high level officials should result in per se knowledge. When lower level of-
ficers are involved, however, lines of demarcation are not as clear. In such
instances the inquiry as to corporate awareness should be dependent upon
the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In situations where a cor-
poration has closed its eyes to an official's illegal acts, vicarious liability
should be imposed and constructive knowledge should suffice.20' In view of
the Seventh Circuit's requirements of employer awareness and actual bene-
fit, the application of respondeat superior is unduly restrictive. In response,
plaintiffs should also seek to impose liability based upon the theory of ap-
parent authority. Under apparent authority, a principal is subject to liabil-
ity "even if the conduct was committed solely to advance the agent's
scheme."2" 2 Further, the focus under apparent authority is on the plain-
tiff's view of the scope of the agent's authority as opposed to the employer's
knowledge."203
196. 838 F.2d 964, 968 (7th Cir. 1988).
197. Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
198. Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1297; see also Pandick v. Rooney, 688 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (corporation had knowledge).
199. D & S Auto Parts, 838 F.2d at 967 n.5; see also Onesti v. Thompson McKinnon Sec.,
Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. 11. 1987).
200. Harrison, 695 F. Supp. at 962.
201. Id. at 962-63.
202. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. v. Shearson-American Exp., 658 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (D. P.R.
1987).
203. Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Stores Servs., 634 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (w.D.N.C. 1986).
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
B. Aiding and Abetting
In addition to the utilization of the theory of respondeat superior, it now
appears that a RICO plaintiff may be able to reach a "deep pocket" under
the civil common-law theory of aiding and abetting. Aiding and abetting
has most commonly been used as a theory of criminal liability. 2 However,
the doctrine also has civil application and as such has been codified in the
Restatement of Torts.2" 5 The Fifth Circuit, in Armco Industrial Credit
Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,2o6 was the first circuit to embrace the theory
of aiding and abetting in the civil RICO context, 0 7 but did not specifically
address the rationale(s) supporting the adoption of the aiding and abetting
theory. The Armco decision does, however, clearly establish that the plain-
tiff must prove the alleged aider or abettor "shared in the criminal intent of
the principals. 2
°8
Recently, the Third Circuit in Petro-Tech reaffirmed the Fifth Circuit's
decision to allow access to a deep pocket based upon aiding and abetting.0 9
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit asserted rationale in support of
the imposition of civil RICO liability under the aiding and abetting theory.
The Third Circuit held, that as a civil concept, the theory of aiding and
abetting "will advance RICO's goals."' E20 Essentially, the Third Circuit's
rationale behind the application of aiding and abetting is two-fold. First,
civil RICO liability is dependent upon the commission of a pattern of crimi-
nal acts. 11 Second, it is a general rule that anyone who aids or abets a
crime is just as guilty of the crime as the actual perpetrator.212 Accordingly,
anyone who aids or abets the crimes leading up to a RICO violation should
be just as liable for them as the actual criminal. However, it must be recog-
nized that the Third Circuit limited the doctrine's application to subsection
1962(a).2 13 The court explicitly stated that the use of the aiding and abet-
ting theory under subsection 1962(c) would disrupt the subsection's in-
204. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949); Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1984).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1976). For cases discussing civil aiding
and abetting, see Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481-86 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Cobb v. Indian
Springs, Inc., 258 Ark. 9, 522 S.W.2d 383 (1975); Rael v. Cadena, 93 N.M. 684, 604 P.2d 822
(1979).
206. 782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986).
207. Id. at 483-86.
208. Id. at 485.
209. Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1356-62.
210. Id. at 1357.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1360-61.
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tended operation.2"4 Interestingly, the court did not address the viability of
the theory as to subsection 1962(b) claims. It seems likely that some cir-
cuits will apply the theory of aiding and abetting to subsection 1962(b)
claims in view of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Liquid Air, which pro-
vided that the doctrine of respondeat superior applied to subsection 1962(b)
claims.215
VI. CONCLUSION
By virtue of civil RICO's treble damages and attorney fees provision,2" 6
the Act is one of the most fearsome weapons in a plaintiff's arsenal. Civil
RICO offers a unique opportunity to punish illegal acts where it would be
impossible to satisfy the burden of proof in a criminal case.' 7 However, in
a given case, the corporate defendant may be the only potential defendant
with the proverbial deep pocket. Accordingly, RICO's utility in many in-
stances is dependent upon the plaintiff's ability to gain access to this deep
pocket. Recently, courts have granted access more freely through the appli-
cation of the theories of respondeat superior and aiding and abetting. The
application of these doctrines as well as apparent authority to violations of
subsections 1962(a) and (b) is consistent with RICO's intent and does not
result in the abuse of the scope of the Act.
214. Id. at 1359.
215. Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1301.
216. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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